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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the potential impacts of the rights of migrant workers (“migrant rights”) on 
the human development of actual and potential migrants, their families, and other people in 
migrants’ countries of origin. A key feature of the paper is its consideration of how migrant 
rights affect both the capability to move and work in higher income countries (i.e. the access of 
workers in low-income countries to labour markets of higher-income countries) and capabilities 
while living and working abroad. The paper suggests that there may be a trade-off between the 
number and some of the rights of low-skilled migrants admitted to high-income countries and 
explores the implications for human development. 
Keywords: Migrant rights, immigration policy, human development, global labor markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The rights of migrant workers (―migrant rights‖) play an important role in shaping the outcomes 
of migration for migrants and non-migrants in sending and receiving countries. For example, 
whether or not migrants enjoy the right to free choice of employment in the receiving country‘s 
labour market is likely to affect their earnings, remittances, and competition with local workers. 
Migrant rights can also influence the decisions and opportunities of individuals or households to 
migrate to particular countries. Rights to settlement and family reunion, for example, may be an 
important factor in the choice of destination. They may also affect how easy or difficult it is to be 
legally admitted to particular countries and therefore help shape global migration flows and 
patterns.        
 
Most academic studies and policy debates on ―migration and development‖ have paid relatively 
little attention to the role of migrant rights. Discussions of the economic and developmental 
effects of international labour migration on migrants and their countries of origin (see, for 
example, World Bank 2005) have been largely disconnected from debates about rights which are 
typically based on legal and moral considerations about socio-economic and political 
vulnerabilities of non-citizens living abroad (see, for example, Taran 2000).  The recent 
discussions at the Global Forum of Migration and Development in Brussels (2007) and Manila 
(2008) are important exceptions. The main theme of the forum in Manila was ―how the 
contribution of migrants to development taken in its widest context, can be enhanced by making 
the protection of their rights a shared responsibility of origin and host societies‖ (Abella 2008, 
p.1).   To further develop this important debate, there is an urgent need for more conceptual and 
empirical analysis that explicitly links and studies the inter-relationships between migrant rights 
and development.  
 
The aim of this paper is to conceptualise and explore the potential impacts of migrant rights on 
the human development of actual and potential migrants, their families, and other people in 
migrants‘ countries of origin. A key feature of the paper is its consideration of how migrant rights 
affect both the capability to move and work in higher income countries (i.e. the access of workers 
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in low-income countries to labour markets of higher-income countries) and capabilities while 
living and working abroad. The paper suggests that there may be a trade-off between the number 
and some of the rights of low-skilled migrants admitted to high-income countries and explores the 
implications for human development.  
 
Building on Ruhs and Martin (2008), the discussion focuses on international labour migration 
and the rights of migrant workers. It links different strands of literature on migrant rights, 
migration impacts, immigration policy and human development. Much of the discussion will be 
conceptual but arguments are supported by empirical examples and short illustrative case studies. 
The paper is intended as a ―think-piece‖ that provides a conceptual framework for discussing 
important but so far largely ignored questions about the relationship between migrant rights and 
human development. The impacts of immigration and migrant rights on the human development 
of residents of migrant-receiving countries will not be considered. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 briefly discusses the concepts of human rights, 
citizenship rights and human development. The focus is on basic definitions, key features and 
inter-dependencies that are relevant to this paper. I argue that, rather than considering them in 
isolation, migrant rights are – and should be analysed as – a core component of nation states‘ 
immigration policies. The analysis of the effects of migrant rights on human development thus 
needs to consider potential inter-relationships with other migration policy components, including 
especially the number and selection of migrants admitted, and consider the overall effects of 
particular ―immigration policy regimes‖ on human development. To facilitate such analysis, 
Section 3 proposes a simple typology of immigration policy regimes, characterised and 
differentiated by how they regulate the number, selection and rights of migrants. It discusses, at a 
conceptual and empirical level, the relationships between the number, selection and rights of 
migrants admitted under different regimes. In light of this analysis, Section 4 then explores how 
migrant rights impact on the human development of actual and potential migrants, their families 
and other people in migrants‘ countries of origin.  
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2 Concepts: Human rights, citizenship rights and human development  
2.1 Migrant rights as human rights 
 
At the risk of simplification, it is useful to distinguish between two overlapping yet in many ways 
distinct approaches to conceptualising and discussing migrant rights. The first approach, 
commonly adopted by international organisations, NGOs and others concerned with the 
protection of rights, is to view migrant rights primarily as human rights (see, for example, NGO 
Committee on Migration 2008). The key features and principles of human rights include: 
universality, i.e. they apply everywhere and to everyone (including migrants); indivisibility, i.e. 
there is no hierarchy of rights and certain types of rights cannot be separated from others; 
inalienability, i.e. human rights cannot be denied to any human being, nor can they be given up 
voluntarily; and equality and non-discrimination, i.e. all individuals are equal as human beings.
1
 
Human rights derive from a ―common humanity‖ and the ―inherent dignity of each human 
person‖ rather than from citizenship of a particular country.   
 
The legal and normative basis of this approach comprises various international human rights 
treaties and separate legal instruments that specifically relate to migrants (for overviews of the 
international human rights framework for migrants, see, for example Cholewinski 1997; 
Aleinikoff and Chetail 2003; and Grant 2005). The three most significant international legal 
instruments that specifically address the rights of migrant workers are the UN‘s International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (MWC, adopted in 1990) and the ILO‘s Migration of Employment Convention (1949) 
and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (1975).  Together with the 
more general human rights treaties, these instruments set out a very comprehensive set of rights 
for migrants, including the right to equal protections under labour laws, anti-discrimination laws 
and family laws (for an overview, see Weissbrodt 2003; ILO 2004). The MWC in particular has 
become a cornerstone of the rights-based approach to migration advocated by many international 
                                                 
1
 A longer list and explanation of key human rights principles can be found in the UN Common Understanding on the 
Human Rights Based Approach to Development (UNDG 2003).    
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organisations and NGOs concerned with the protection of migrant workers. It sets out a very 
broad set of rights for migrants, including those living and/or working abroad illegally.    
 
In practice, the ratifications of the MWC and ILO conventions on migrant workers by state parties 
have been very disappointing (see Tables 1 and 2 below), in both absolute terms (i.e. considering 
the total number of UN and ILO member states) and in relative terms (i.e. compared to the 
ratifications of other human rights treaties and ILO conventions). The MWC is the least ratified 
treaty among all major human rights treaties. It has a quarter of the ratifications of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (passed a year before the MWC) and also fewer ratifications than the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (passed 16 years after the MWC). The few 
countries that have ratified migrant worker conventions are predominantly migrant-sending rather 
than migrant-receiving countries.
2
 Despite having signed general human rights treaties, nation 
states, especially major immigration countries, are clearly reluctant to ratify international 
conventions that limit their discretion and ability to restrict the rights of migrants living and 
working on their territories.    
 
Table 1: Ratifications of principal international human rights treaties (as of 2008) 
UN human rights 
Treaties (year) 
CERD 
(1965) 
CCPR 
(1966) 
CESCR 
(1966) 
CEDAW 
(1979) 
CAT 
(1984) 
CRC 
(1989) 
MWC 
(1990) 
CRPD 
(2006) 
State parties 173 163 159 185 145 193 39 41 
CERD = International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;  
CCPR = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;  
CESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;  
CEDAW = Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;  
                                                 
2
 As of October 2008, the MWC has been ratified by Albania (2007), Algeria (2005), Argentina (2007), Azerbaijan 
(1999),  Belize (2001), Bolivia (2000), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), Burkina Faso (2003), Cape Verde (1997), 
Chile (2005), Colombia (1995), Ecuador (2002), Egypt (1993), El Salvador (2003), Ghana (2000), Guatemala (2003),  
Guinea (2000), Honduras (2005), Jamaica (2008), Kyrgyzstan (2003), Lesotho (2005), Libvan Arab Jamahitiya 
(2004),  Mali (2003), Mauritania (2007), Mexico (1999), Morocco (1993), Nicaragua (2005), Paraguay (2008), Peru 
(2005), Philippines (1995), Senegal (1999), Seychelles (1994), Sri Lanka (1996), Syrian Arab Republic (2005), 
Tajikistan (2002), Timor-Leste (2004), Turkey (2004), Uganda (1995), and Uruguay (2001).  
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CAT= Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment;  
CRC = Convention on the Rights of the Child;  
MWC =International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families. 
CRPD =Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
The UN has 192 member states.  
Source: www.unhchr.ch accessed on 26 Nov 2008 
  
Table 2: Ratifications of ILO fundamental conventions and migrant worker conventions (as of 
Dec 2008) 
ILO 
conventions 
Freedom of 
association 
and 
collective 
bargaining 
Elimination of 
forced and 
compulsory 
labor 
Elimination of 
discrimination 
in employment 
and occupation 
Abolition of 
child labor 
Migrant 
Workers 
Convention 
number 
(year) 
87 
(1948) 
98 
(1949) 
29 
(1930) 
105 
(1957) 
100 
(1951) 
111 
(1958) 
138 
(1973) 
182 
(1999) 
97 
(1949) 
143 
(1975) 
Number of 
ratifications 
by countries 
 
149 
 
159 
 
173 
 
171 
 
166 
 
168 
 
151 
 
169 
 
48 
 
23 
Note: The ILO has 182 member states.  
Source: See www.ilo.org accessed on 1 Dec 2008 
 
The most cursory review of the rights of migrant workers around the world confirms that the 
majority, and especially those working in low-waged jobs, enjoy very few of the rights stipulated 
in international conventions. For example, under most existing temporary migration programmes 
in North America and Europe, migrants have neither the right to free choice of employment nor 
the access to welfare benefits that citizens and long-term residents typically enjoy. In many of the 
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Persian Gulf States in the Middle East, which have long admitted significant numbers of migrant 
workers, the protections of local labour laws do not apply to certain types of migrant labour. In 
Singapore, another major employer of migrant workers, migrants working in low-waged jobs are 
officially prohibited from co-habiting with, or getting married to, a Singaporean citizen. Illegally 
resident migrants, whose global numbers are substantial, have very few rights regardless of what 
country they are working in (with very few exceptions).  
 
The gap between the comprehensive set of rights stipulated by the international human rights 
framework and on the one hand, and the rights that most migrant workers enjoy in practice on the 
other, should not be taken as a reason for rejecting the human rights approach as ineffective. Even 
if they are not ratified, international migrant rights treaties can play an important political and 
strategic role. For example, Wexler (2007) argues that they can influence non-binding regional 
processes, contribute to the development and dissemination of best practices, and help produce 
and codify a human rights discourse. Sen (2004) argues that human rights can be viewed as 
important ethical demands (rather than direct legal claims and commands) that highlight the 
significance of considering the freedoms of human beings. Nevertheless, the low levels of 
ratification and the discrepancy between migrant rights in human rights treaties and practice do 
point to the importance of paying attention to the role and interests of nation states. Many 
immigration countries that accept the idea of human rights (which are meant to apply to all 
people) clearly do not accept that these rights should also apply to migrants living on their 
territories. Migrant rights cannot, therefore, be comprehensively analysed and debated without a 
discussion of citizenship and the role and interests of the state in granting and restricting migrant 
rights.    
 
2.2 Migrant rights as citizenship rights  
 
Citizenship is a complex concept that can be conceptualised and discussed in various different 
ways. One can distinguish, for example, between citizenship as formal status and substantial 
rights, legal status and practice, positive and normative uses, and, more generally, between 
―think‖ and ―thick‖ conceptualisations (see, for example, Baubock 2001; Castles and Davidson 
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2000). In recent years, there has also been increasing debate about the ―location‖ of citizenship 
and citizenship rights. Although most conceptualizations are still based on the nation state, 
scholars have analysed ―transnational citizenship‖, ―global citizenship‖, ―post-national 
citizenship‖, and ―cosmopolitan citizenship‖ (see Bosniak 2006). There is also discussion about 
whether human rights can and should be seen as universalised citizenship (e.g. Baubock 1994).  
 
For the purpose of this paper, it is useful to view citizenship as a legal status that links individuals 
to states and that is associated with certain citizenship rights and duties (i.e. a ―thin‖ 
conceptualisation of citizenship based on legal positivism). Citizenship rights may be broadly 
divided into civic, political and social rights (Marshall 1965) and/or classified into more detailed 
categories such as economic rights, cultural rights and gender rights (see Castles and Davidson 
2000). Although their control over immigration is inevitably incomplete (see, for example, 
Joppke 1998), nation states have significant power to regulate access to citizenship and 
citizenship rights. This is reflected in the fact that the requirements and processes by which 
citizenship is acquired, and the rights and duties associated with citizenship status, vary 
significantly both across and within countries over time (for a recent review of citizenship 
policies in the EU countries, see Baubock et al 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).  
  
Migrants without citizenship status in the host country are an important and growing group of 
residents in many countries who do not enjoy full citizenship rights (―quasi-citizens‖ or 
―denizens‖, Hammar 1990).  The immigration and integration policies of nation states typically 
result in highly differentiated rights between citizens and various types of non-citizens. Most 
countries make significant distinctions, for example, between the rights of migrants with 
permanent residence status (who usually enjoy most of the rights of citizens except for the right to 
vote); temporary migrants (whose economic and social rights are often restricted); and illegally 
resident migrants (who typically enjoy few rights in most countries). Further distinctions and 
restrictions of rights based on the migrant‘s specific citizenship (e.g. member states of the 
European Union grant other EU nationals more rights than non-EU nationals) and purpose of 
residence (e.g. work, study, join family, asylum) are common and often contribute to highly 
complex immigration systems. For example, until recently the UK‘s immigration policies 
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distinguished between over 80 different types of immigration status, each of which was associated 
with different rights and restrictions in the UK (see Ruhs and Anderson 2008).   
 
The conceptualisation of migrant rights as citizenship rights that primarily derive from nation 
states suggests that, to understand why and when a particular country grants or restrict the rights 
of different groups of migrants, it is necessary to analyse the potential economic interests as well 
as political traditions, social structures and cultural understandings (Baubock 1994) that may 
underlie immigration policy and public policy decisions more generally.     
 
Given this approach, a key argument and starting point of this paper is that the rights of migrant 
workers are – and should be analysed as – one of the three core components of labour 
immigration policy. At its core, the design of labour immigration policy requires nation states to 
make three fundamental decisions: (i) how to regulate the number of migrants to be admitted (e.g. 
through quotas or points-based systems); (ii) how to select migrants (e.g. by skill and/or 
nationality); and (iii) what rights to grant migrants after admission (e.g. temporary of permanent 
residence). The analysis of the effects of migrant rights on human development thus needs to 
consider potential inter-relationships with other migration policy components, including 
especially the number and selection of migrants admitted, and consider the overall effects of 
particular ―immigration policy regimes‖ on human development. 
 
2.3 Human Development  
 
Building largely on the work by Amartya Sen (1980, 1999), human development can be defined 
as a process of ―enlarging people‘s choices and enhancing human capabilities (the range of things 
people can be and do) and freedoms, enabling them to: live a long and healthy life, have access to 
knowledge and a decent standard of living, and participate in the life of their community and 
decisions affecting their lives‖.3 In Sen‘s words, capability ―represents the the various 
combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve‖ (Sen 1992, p.40). 
                                                 
3
 UNDP, ‗Origins of the Human Development Approach, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/origins/ , accessed on 2 
December 2008 
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A capability-approach is ―people-centred‖ in the sense that it focuses on agency and choice. As 
Sen explains, ―capability concentrates on the opportunity to be able to have combinations of 
functionings ..., and the person is free to make use of this opportunity or not. [...]. The Term 
freedom, in the form of capability, is used here to refer to the extent to which the person is free to 
choose particular levels of functionings ..., and that is not the same thing as what the person 
actually decides to do‖ (Sen 2005, p. 155-156).      
 
The concept of human development is inherently multi-dimensional (see the discussion in Alkire 
2002). Theoretical discussions and empirical applications of the human development approach 
have identified various different dimensions of well-being and development. Nussbaum (2000), 
for example, lists central human functional capabilities related to life, bodily health, bodily 
integrity, senses, imagination, thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play 
and control over one‘s environment. A World Bank study of how poor people perceive and 
experienced poverty distinguished between material, bodily, social, psychological, emotional 
well-being, security and freedom of choice and action (Narayan et al 2000).
4
 Although Sen has 
not followed others in trying to identify a definite list of capabilities that is universally applicable, 
he has highlighted the importance of basic capabilities such as ―the ability to move about‖, ―the 
ability to meet one‘s nutritional requirements‖, ―the wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered‖, and 
―the power to participate in the social life of the community‖ (Sen 1980, p. 218).  
   
However the dimensions of human development are defined in a particular study, it is clear that 
they include but necessarily go beyond traditional economic measures of material well-being such 
as income and economic welfare. Human development can also take account of some – but not all 
– of the issues and freedoms that are addressed by a human rights approach. As discussed in a 
previous Human Development Report (2000), the idea of human development shares a common 
motivation with human rights. Both approaches ―reflect a fundamental commitment to promoting 
the freedom, well-being and dignity of individuals in all societies‖ (UNDP 2000, p. 19). Despite 
their basic compatibility, however, it is important not to conflate human development with human 
rights.  As Sen (2005) points out, although it can support many human rights, the capability 
                                                 
4
 Alkire (2002) provides a useful comparative discussion of the various dimensions of human development identified 
in different studies.  
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approach cannot adequately take account of ―process freedoms‖ such as the right to ―due process‖ 
in legal proceedings.      
 
A key feature of the human development approach, which is particularly important in the context 
of this paper, is its explicit recognition of the possibility of conflicts and trade-offs between 
different dimensions of development (or between different components of capability) and the 
consequent need to engage in ―public debate and reasoning‖ about how to value and prioritise 
competing capabilities and objectives.
5
 Sen explains,  
 
“..one of the uses of the capability approach is to bring out the need for transparent 
valuational scrutiny of individual advantages and adversities, since the different 
functionings have to be assessed and weighted in relation to each other, and the 
opportunities of having different combinations of functionings also have to be 
evaluated” (Sen 2005, p. 157) 
 
The emphasis on the need for valuation and public debate of potential trade-offs distinguishes the 
human development approach from both traditional economic approaches that focus on income as 
the only measure of well-being, and from human rights approaches that consider rights indivisible 
and therefore find it more difficult to engage in debate about trade-offs and priorities
6
. As the 
UNDP‘s report on human rights and human development argues: 
 
                                                 
5
 The concept of ―decent work‖, which has informed the recent work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO),  
is similar in its emphasis of the multi-dimensionality and potential trade-offs between different dimensions of labour 
market outcomes for individuals. For example, Martin Godfrey‘s (2003) discussion of decent work explicitly 
mentions the potential trade-offs between the quantity and quality of work available.   
6
 It is important to emphasise, however, that human rights scholars and activists have discussed the priority of some 
rights over others. For example, despite the principle of indivisibility, there has been debate about whether economic 
and social rights (which are sometimes described as ―second-generation rights‖) are of a different order than civil and 
political rights (―first-generation― rights).  Much of this debate revolves around the justiciability of economic and 
social rights (see, for example, Dennis and Stewart 2004; and Christiansen 2007).  There have been important recent 
developments that suggest an increasing recognition of the fundamental nature of socio-economic rights as human 
rights. For example, the UN‘s Human Rights Council recently adopted the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2008), which allows individuals to bring complaints about 
violations of their economic, social, and cultural rights to the attention of the Committee on Economic, Social & 
Cultural Rights. 
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“Human rights advocates have often asserted the indivisibility and importance of all 
human rights. This claim makes sense if it is understood as denying that there is a 
hierarchy of different kinds of rights (economic, civil, cultural, political and social). 
But it cannot be denied that scarcity of resources and institutional constraints often 
require us to prioritize concern for securing different rights for the purposes of policy 
choice. Human development analysis helps us to see these choices in explicit and 
direct terms” (UNDP 2000, p.23) 
 
In the context of the effects of migration and migrant rights, the capability approach is 
particularly useful because it can distinguish, and requires critical discussion of potential 
conflicts, between: (i) the capability to move and work abroad (i.e. capabilities before migration); 
and (ii) the capabilities while working and living abroad and, if applicable, after return 
(capabilities after emigration). This distinction is, I argue, critical to exploring the relationship 
between migrant rights and human development.   
 
3 Numbers vs rights: Towards a typology of policy regimes for low-skilled immigration 
 
This section discusses, at a conceptual and empirical level, the relationship between the number, 
selection and rights of migrants in high-income countries. The conceptual analysis is largely (but 
not exclusively) based on economic considerations. It highlights the key difference between high 
and low-skilled immigration and then focuses on exploring the relationship between the number 
and rights of migrants working in low-skilled jobs in high-income countries. The analysis 
suggests three economic reasons – one to do with the characteristics of the supply of migrant 
labour and the nature of competitive labour markets, the other two with the economic interests 
and policies of high-income countries – why there could be a negative relationship (a trade-off) 
between the number and rights of low-skilled migrant workers. In light of this analysis, I propose 
a simple typology of policy regimes for regulating low-skilled immigration and provide 
illustrative empirical examples.   
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3.1 The economics of regulating the numbers and rights of migrant workers
7
 
 
Economic considerations suggest that we can expect an important asymmetry in the relationship 
between the numbers and rights of high-skilled and low-skilled migrants. Highly skilled migrants 
are relatively scarce in the global economy. A significant number of high income countries with a 
high and increasing demand for skills are competing for a relatively small pool of highly qualified 
workers willing to migrate. As a result, qualified migrants are able to choose among competing 
destinations, and their choice of destination is likely to depend on both expected earnings and 
expected rights in destination areas. Countries that offer relatively few rights to highly skilled 
migrants can be expected to receive relatively small numbers of migrants and vice versa. We can 
thus expect to see a positive relationship between the relative number and rights of highly skilled 
migrants in practice. Various empirical examples support this argument.  
 
For example, Canada and Australia, two countries that have long been successful at attracting 
skilled migrants, grant qualified migrants permanent residence and the associated comprehensive 
set of rights immediately upon arrival (see, for example, Richardson and Lester, 2004). The UK‘s 
Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP), introduced in 2002 and recently converted into Tier 
1 of the UK‘s new points-based system for managing immigration, aims to attract highly qualified 
migrants by offering them the opportunity to migrate to the UK without a job offer and the right 
to apply for permanent residence after five years of residence in the UK. Take-up of the HSMP 
increased from less than 5,000 in 2002 to over 20,000 in 2006 (Migration Advisory Committee 
2008). In contrast, Germany‘s ―Green Card‖ program for attracting IT workers from abroad 
offered a five-year work permit without a clear path to permanent residency status, and attracted 
significantly fewer than the 20,000 visas offered (for a discussion, see Kolb, 2005).
8
 
 
In contrast, the relationship between the number and rights of low-skilled migrants in high-
income countries is likely to be negative (i.e. characterized by a trade-off).  There is an almost 
unlimited supply of potential migrants in low-income countries willing to accept low-skilled jobs 
                                                 
7
 The discussion in this section builds on Ruhs and Martin (2008).  
8
 Following the failure of the Green Card system to attract significant numbers of highly skilled migrants, Germany 
passed a new immigration law in 2004 that provides for unlimited residence permits for highly qualified migrants and 
their families. 
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in higher-income countries at wages, employment conditions and rights that are significantly 
lower than those mandated by local laws and international norms. Migrants may not demand 
equal treatment in the labor markets of higher-income countries, especially if they are recently 
arrived (―new‖ migrants), plan a limited and relatively short spell of employment abroad and/or 
consider the wages and employment conditions in the labour markets in their countries of origin 
as their primary ―frame of reference‖ (Piore, 1979). The ―excess‖ supply of low-skilled migrant 
labour means that employers in high-income countries can increase the employment and at the 
same time reduce the wages and rights of low-skilled migrants.     
 
Employers face a downward sloping demand curve for labour, meaning that, ceteris paribus, 
higher labour costs will be associated with fewer workers employed. Certain employment rights 
for workers – such as the right to minimum wage, work-related benefits and health and safety 
standards – increase labour costs for employers, thus generating a numbers–rights trade-off. In 
other words, employers‘ demand curve for labour is downward sloping with regard to certain 
rights. The trade-off between the rights and number of employed workers is familiar, as when 
employers oppose minimum wage increases because they assert that higher labor costs will mean 
fewer jobs. The analogy to migrants‘ rights is clear: if migrants have all the economic and social 
rights laid out in ILO and UN conventions, including the right to equal wages and all work-
related benefits, their cost to employers will be higher and fewer will be employed. On the other 
hand, more limited migrant rights may mean lower costs for employers and more migrants 
employed. In this sense, increasing the rights of migrants can affect their employment in the same 
way that a higher minimum wage can reduce the number of jobs (for all workers, not just 
migrants). Of course, it needs to be added that not all rights create significant costs for employers. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that some rights do create costs and that significant increases in labor 
costs will, ceteris paribus, encourage profit-maximizing employers to reduce the number of jobs 
on offer.    
 
The numbers–rights trade-off described above rests entirely on the rational behavior of employers 
and workers, and can be expected to hold in any competitive labor market. If the state stipulates a 
relatively high set of employment rights for low-skilled migrants, employer demand – and thus 
14 
 
the number of migrants legally employed in low-skilled jobs – can be expected to be lower than 
what it would be if migrants had fewer rights. 
 
There may also be two other economic factors, stemming from the interests and policies of the 
state rather than the actions of employers and workers, that help to generate a negative 
relationship between the number of low-skilled migrants and their rights in high-income 
countries. The first of these factors relates to the fiscal effects of immigration. The net fiscal 
impact of immigration, i.e. the difference between the taxes that migrants pay and the costs of 
public services and benefits that migrants consume, largely depend on: migrants‘ age, earnings, 
and eligibility for and take-up of government benefits and services; the nature of the welfare 
system, especially the extent to which it redistributes income from high- to low-income earners; 
and how immigration affects non- migrants‘ contribution to and use of the welfare state, e.g. 
through positive or negative impacts on employment rates of non-migrants (see, for example, 
Rowthorn 2008). Everything else being equal, low-skilled migrants employed in low-waged jobs 
can be expected to pay fewer taxes and be eligible for more welfare benefits than the average 
resident of high-income countries. There is empirical research that suggests that the net-fiscal 
effects of low-skilled migrants are negative (see, for example, Smith and Edmonston 1997
9
; 
Storesletten 2000). In order to minimize the fiscal costs of low-skilled migrants for existing 
residents, high-income countries may therefore be expected to limit migrant numbers or their 
access to welfare benefits.  
 
The labour market and income effects of low-skilled immigration may create another incentive 
for states to admit or increase the number of low-skilled migrants only if some of their rights can 
be restricted. As discussed in Ruhs (2008), if the policy objectives are to  maximise the economic 
benefits and minimise adverse impacts on the lowest paid among existing residents, high income-
countries have economic incentives to admit low-skilled migrants on a temporary rather than 
permanent basis and restrict their employment to carefully selected sectors and/or occupations of 
the host economy‘s labour market. These are sectors and/or occupations where it is genuinely 
                                                 
9
 Smith and Edmonston‘s (1997) assessment of the long-term fiscal impacts of immigration in the US concludes that 
the net present value of the fiscal impact of an immigrant with  less than high school education is -$13,000 while that 
of an immigrant with more than high school education is +$198,000.    
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difficult or impossible to address staff shortages by raising wages and/or alternative mechanisms 
such as adopting less labour intensive production methods in the short run; and/or where there is 
evidence that the costs of lower wages (or lower wage growth) that some resident workers incur 
because of immigration are outweighed by the benefits the resident population derives from the 
lower prices of commodities and services that are produced/provided by migrants. Limiting low-
skilled migrants‘ length of stay and restricting their right to free choice of employment can thus 
be important to the objective of maximizing the overall economic benefits of immigration for 
existing residents while protecting lowest-paid residents, and this may be reflected in high-
income countries‘ labour immigration policies.10   
 
Taken together, these three factors – (i) the excess supply of low-skilled migrant labour and the 
downward sloping labour demand curve with respect to some rights; (ii) the fiscal effects of 
immigration; and (iii) the labour market and income effects of immigration on existing residents 
of high-income countries – provide an economic basis for expecting to observe a trade-off 
between the number and some of the economic and social rights of low-skilled migrant workers 
in high-income countries in practice. To avoid unintended confusion and at the risk of stating the 
obvious, it is worth making two clarifying remarks about this hypothesis.  
 
First, it is important to emphasise that economic considerations are not necessarily the only factor 
that determine the relationship between the number and rights of migrant workers in high income 
countries. In practice, nation states‘ interests and policies on labour immigration may be 
determined by a range of economic, social, political and moral considerations. For example, states 
that make egalitarianism and/or compliance with international human rights norms key 
components of their national identity may be reluctant to restrict migrant rights. Restricting 
migrants‘ rights may also generate significant social costs, especially if the restrictions are long 
term and lead to the emergence of a large group of ―second-class residents.‖ Furthermore, as 
shown by a rapidly increasing political science literature on the determinants of immigration 
policy (see, for example, Freeman and Kessler 2008; Meyers 2007), national policy may not 
always be ―rational‖ and based on a clear set of objectives of maximising certain economic or 
                                                 
10
 To avoid undercutting in the labour market, however, it will be in the economic interest of high-income countries 
to grant migrants all other employment rights enjoyed by resident workers.     
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other national interests. Policy decisions could instead be the outcome of negotiations, power 
struggles and compromises made among different actors (e.g. different government departments) 
within the state bureaucracy. Alternatively, immigration policy may be driven by interests groups 
and ―client politics‖ (see, for example, Freeman‘s classic 1995 paper on the ―modes of 
immigration politics‖). The role of economic considerations in labour immigration policy is 
essentially an empirical question that is likely to vary across countries and over time. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect economic considerations to play at least some role in the 
design of policies for admitting migrant workers. Policies that lead to sustained fiscal losses or 
significant adverse impacts on low-paid residents are often politically unpopular and may be 
unsustainable in the long term.  
 
Second, by suggesting the theoretical possibility of a trade-off between the number and rights of 
low-skilled migrant workers in high-income countries, I am not arguing or assuming that it is 
normatively desirable to restrict migrant rights. What I am saying is that there are economic 
effects and mechanisms which suggest that we may observe an inverse relationship between the 
number and rights of low-skilled migrants in practice. If this is so – an open empirical question 
that I begin to explore below – it is an important consideration to take into account when 
discussing the effects of migrant rights on human development.  
 
3.2 Empirical examples of different policy regimes for regulating low-skilled labour 
immigration  
 
There are numerous empirical examples that support the hypothesis of a trade-off between the 
number and rights of low-skilled migrant workers in high-income countries. Depending on how 
exactly rights and numbers are balanced, it is possible to identify three policy-regimes for low-
skilled immigration: (i) high numbers and few rights; (ii) low numbers and comprehensive rights; 
and (iii) a balance of numbers and rights that falls between the extremes of (i) and (ii). This 
section briefly discusses selected empirical examples of these different regimes and tentatively 
explores the reasons for restricting rights under each regime. The discussion is based on current 
and past experiences and policies in different countries. How numbers and rights are balanced in a 
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particular country may of course change over time. The focus of the brief discussion below is on 
identifying different regimes rather than on systematically analysing the determinants of policy 
choices in different countries. In practice, immigration policy regimes are likely to be related to 
wider economic and social policies as well as to the political system and structure.     
 
Typologies and analysis of ―regimes‖ have been extensively used in various fields of social 
science including, for example, in the comparative analysis of: social policy and welfare states 
(e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990); labour market and employment policies (e.g. Schmid 1997); 
monetary policy (e.g. Mishkin 1999); political regimes and forms of government (Alavrez et al 
1996); international rules, institutions and governing arrangements (e.g. Krasner 1982); and the 
social rights of migrants (Sainsbury 2006).  I use the term ―regime‖ simply to distinguish between 
different approaches to regulating low-skilled labour immigration in high-income countries. The 
typology of regimes proposed below is preliminary and meant as a starting point for further 
discussion and more systematic empirical analysis of the prevalence, determinants and effects of 
different approaches to regulating labour immigration and restricting migrant rights. Typologies 
are not a goal in itself but a means of helping represent reality (Klant 1984). Arts and Gelissen 
(2002) argue that typologies are particularly useful to empirical analysis that is still in its infancy. 
This clearly applies to the analysis of the relationship between the number, selection and rights of 
low-skilled migrants in high-income countries.   
 
 
High numbers, few rights: GCC countries 
 
The most extreme examples of countries operating high numbers-few rights labour immigration 
policies are the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates).  Following Europe and the US, the GCC states are 
today the third most important global destination for migrants. As shown in Table 3 below, the 
GCC states hosted almost 13 million migrants in 2005, more than 50 percent more than in 1990, 
and representing over a third of the GCC population in 2005. This is substantially higher than the 
share of migrants in Europe (9 percent) and Northern America (14 percent). Since the labour 
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market participation rates of migrants are much higher than that of GCC citizens, the share of 
migrants in the GCC labour force significantly exceeds their population shares. According to the 
latest figures available, foreign nationals account for 90 percent of the labour force in the United 
Arab Emirates, 86 percent in Qatar, 81 percent in Kuwait, 71 percent in Oman, 59 percent in 
Bahrain and 50 percent in Saudi Arabia
11
 (DESA 2006, p.16). Although doing all kinds of high 
and low-skilled work , the majority of migrants in GCC countries are employed in medium and 
low-skilled jobs, especially in the private sector where, in some countries, very few citizens are 
employed. In Kuwait, for example, migrants constitute over 90 percent of the private sector 
workforce (Kuwait Institute of Banking Studies, 2006). The majority of migrants working in 
GCC countries are from Asian countries, a change from the early 1980s when the majority 
originated from Arab countries (see Kapisciewski 2006). The five Asian countries sending most 
migrant workers to the Gulf are the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Egypt 
and Yemen remain major senders among Arab countries. Women constitute about a third of all 
migrants working in GCC countries, a low share compared to other high-income countries. 
Female migrants in the GCC countries are mainly employed in the domestic service sector, care 
giving and health care (DESA 2006).   
 
Table 3: Number and share of migrants in population: GCC countries, Europe,  
 Northern America and World, 1990 and 2005 
 Migrant stock  
in thousands 
Migrant stock 
as % of 
population 
 1990 2005 1990 2005 
GCC  8,260 12,802 37.2 35.7 
   Bahrain 173 295 35.1 40.7 
   Kuwait 1,551 1,669 72.4 62.1 
   Oman 452 628 24.5 24.4 
   Qatar 370 637 79.1 78.3 
   Saudi Arabia 4,743 6,361 29.0 25.9 
                                                 
11
 Some of these figures date back to 2001.  
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   United Arab                     
Emirates 
1,330 3,212 71.2 71.4 
     
Europe 49,381 64,116 6.9 8.8 
Northern America 27,597 44,493 9.7 13.5 
World 154,945 190,634 2.9 2.9 
 Source: Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision, UN Population Division 
 
Labour migration to GCC countries is primarily regulated through the kafala (sponsorship) 
system which is essentially an employer-led, large-scale guest worker programme. Under this 
system, migrants require a kafeel to be given permission to enter and take up employment. Kafeel 
literally translates as sponsor but in practice kafeels are also expected to also be the employer of 
the migrant. To become a kafeel and employ migrant workers, GCC citizens or institutions need 
to make an application to the relevant public authority (e.g. in Kuwait, this is the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labour for workers in the private sector; and the Ministry of Interior for 
domestic workers). If the application is granted, the migrant receives a work permit that is 
temporary (e.g. two years in Kuwait) and, in most cases, renewable for an unlimited number of 
time.  In most GCC countries, there is no opportunity to obtain permanent residence, even if a 
migrant has worked in the country on for many years (as it is often the case in practice). Family 
reunion is possible but fairly restricted. In Kuwait, a working wife cannot sponsor a husband as a 
dependent, while a male migrant worker can sponsor wife and children only if he earns a 
minimum monthly salary which is set at a level that means that, in practice, only a minority of 
migrant workers are eligible to apply for dependent visas (see Shah 2005). Since migrants are 
primarily considered as temporary workers, integration policies and projects are largely absent in 
GCC countries (Fargues 2006).   
 
Migrants‘ access to welfare benefits and rights in the labour market and are significantly 
restricted. Access to welfare benefits and public services are often restricted to citizens.  In the 
labour market, the work permit requires the migrant to work for their sponsor only. Mechanisms 
for filing grievances (e.g. in case of non-payment of wages) are very limited. Domestic workers 
are typically excluded from the protection of local labour laws (which often distinguish between 
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workers employed in the private and public sectors, with citizens mainly employed in the latter).  
However, even if domestic labour laws are applicable and fairly comprehensive (as it is the case 
with private sector labour law in Kuwait), they are in practice often not implemented as migrants 
are also, and apparently first and foremost, subject or immigration and residence law which gives 
the sponsor significant power over the migrant workers. One of kafeels‟ most significant means of 
exercising power over their migrant workers is the constant threat of dismissal, which leads to 
immediate deportation. It is common, for example, for sponsors to hold migrant workers‘ 
passports. Longva (1997, p.89) thus argues that ―by making the expatriate workers entirely 
dependent on the kafeel for their residence and work permits, the Residence Law has barred many 
of them from the possibility of using the Labour Law‘s provisions to defend their legitimate 
rights‖. Although some GCC countries have recently begun to make efforts to grant migrants 
better protection (see the discussion in Baldwin-Edwards 2005), there have been numerous 
reports documenting the denial and abuses of migrant workers‘ rights – in some cases involving 
basic human rights violations – in GCC countries, especially (but not exclusively) of construction 
workers and domestic workers (see, for example, Human Rights Watch 2004). It is not 
uncommon for migrant workers from different countries to be paid different wages for the same 
work (ILO 2002).  None of the GCC countries have ratified the two ILO conventions on migrant 
workers or the UN‘s 1990 MWC (also see Jureidini 2004).          
 
As it is the case in most high-income countries, migrants working illegally have fewest rights. 
Although there are no figures, illegal working of migrants is thought to be considerable in GCC 
countries (Fargues 2006). The great majority of migrants working illegally in GCC states have 
entered legally and then either overstayed their temporary work permits or found themselves the 
victims of the illegal practice of ―visa-trading‖ which often involves the sale of visas to migrants 
without actually offering a job (see Shah 2005).  
 
What are the main reason for the high number and significant restrictions on the rights of migrant 
workers in GCC states?  The primary factor, I would argue, is economic. Since the dramatic 
increase in oil prices and revenues in 1973-74 and 1979, the kafala system, with its in-built 
discrimination between citizens and non-citizens, has provided a cheap migrant workforce that 
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has facilitated the low-cost provision of goods and services in the private sector (including 
domestic services) and the development and maintenance of a generous welfare state whose 
benefits and services are largely limited to citizens. This system has clearly been of significant 
short-term economic benefit to GCC citizens as employers in the private and domestic service 
sectors and as consumers of public services and products/serviced provided by the private sector.  
It has, however, also created long-term economic problems that have begun to be recognized in 
most GCC countries. Most importantly, there have been increasing concerns about disguised and 
open unemployment of GCC citizens who can no longer be absorbed in the public sector. Because 
of the almost complete segregation of the labour market, it has proved very difficult to increase 
the share of citizens employed in the private sector. Attempts to ―localize‖ the workforce have 
been common across GCC countries in recent years (see Shah 2005). So far, they have had only 
limited success. According to Dito (2008, p.8), ―extending social protection to include migrant 
workers will contribute toward leveling the gap between national and migrant workers.‖ In other 
words, granting more rights to migrants can be expected to result in lower numbers.   
 
A second reason for the restriction of migrant workers‘ rights in GCC countries stem from 
concerns about maintaining the national identity and national security, especially in countries 
with small populations and where citizens constitute a small minority of the population (e.g. in 
the United Arab Emirates and in Kuwait). The policy of strictly temporary migration with few or 
no opportunities to acquire permanent residence and citizenship has aimed at maintaining the 
identities of the citizen population without having to actively pursue policies of reducing the 
number of migrant workers. Recent policies aimed at localizing the workforce in GCC countries 
may, however, signal a policy change. In a 2005 survey of government views on the level of 
immigration, all GCC countries except for Bahrain expressed a preference for lowering 
immigration (DESA 2006). 
 
Low numbers, comprehensive rights: Sweden 
 
If the GCC states are at one end of the numbers-rights spectrum (high number - few rights for 
migrant workers), Sweden is located on the other end (low numbers – comprehensive rights). 
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With a population of just under nine million, Sweden has one of the world‘s most advanced social 
welfare states.  It combines a liberal market economy with an extensive state-run welfare state. 
Most comparative analyses of social policy consider Sweden the archetypal ―social democratic 
welfare state‖ (see especially Esping-Andersen 1990) that aims at universal coverage and rights 
and benefit equality. Most wages and employment conditions are determined by collective 
bargaining and, with most workers in unions, employment conditions generally adhere to 
industry-wide standards.   
 
About 12 percent of Sweden‘s population is foreign-born (OECD 2008). However, only a small 
minority of Swedish immigrants have been admitted as migrant workers. With the exception of 
the period 1949-1971 when Sweden experienced labour immigration from Finland and Southern 
Europe, migration to Sweden has primarily consisted of asylum seekers and family members. 
Over the past 30 years, labour immigration from outside the common Nordic labour market has 
been minimal. Of the 42,000 non-Nordic nationals issued residence permits in 2005, only 13 
percent were granted permits for the purpose of employment (Statistics Sweden website
12
). 
According to the OECD (2008), permanent-type labour migration from non-EEA countries was 
less than 400 persons per year in both 2005 and 2006.  
 
Importantly, whenever Sweden has permitted permit labour immigration, migrants were given a 
comprehensive set of economic and social rights, According to the Migrant Integration Policy 
Index (British Council and Migration Policy Group 2007), Sweden ranks highest among EU 
member states in terms of rights granted to migrants in the labour market. Sweden‘s policy of 
granting migrants a comprehensive set of rights is long-standing and largely due to the strong role 
and influence of labour unions which are concerned about ―social dumping‖ and adverse impacts 
on collectively agreed wages and employment conditions. For example, when Sweden recruited 
migrant workers from Yugoslavia and Greece to fill labour shortages in the 1960s, it admitted 
migrant workers as permanent residents and potential future citizens rather than as temporary 
guest workers as was the case in many other European countries at the time. The Swedish 
government cooperated closely with the trade union confederation to ensure that migrant workers 
                                                 
12
 See http://www.scb.se/templates/Publikation____162450.asp accessed on 8 December 2008 
23 
 
were not used as cheap labour and that labour immigration was only allowed if migrants were 
given same wages and rights as Swedes including unemployment benefits (Westin 2006).  
 
More recently, Sweden was among only three countries of the EU 15 member states (Ireland and 
the UK were the others) to grant nationals of the ten countries acceding to the EU in May 2004 
immediate free access to the Swedish labour market. As discussed in Tamas and Munz (2006), 
this decision was taken against the intention of the Swedish government which wanted to 
introduce transitional restrictions – to protect the labour market and social welfare system – but 
lost in a parliamentary vote. Sweden offered migrants from the new EU member states 
unrestricted access to the social welfare system. It also introduced a number of measures aimed at 
preventing immigration from undermining the effectiveness of existing labour market regulations 
and collective bargaining structures (Tamas and Munz 2006). These measures and the insistence 
of equality of rights with Swedish workers more generally, are a major reason why Sweden 
experienced very limited immigration of East Europeans despite its policy on unrestricted access 
to the labour market.   Only 5,000 A8 nationals found jobs in Sweden in 2005. With equal rights 
and effective labour law compliance, there was little reason for employers to hire East European 
migrants to save money.
13
       
 
The experience of the Latvian construction company Laval un Partnery is a good example 
illustrating the trade-off between the number and rights of migrant workers in Sweden. In May 
2004, Laval un Partnery, acting through a subsidiary (L&P Baltic Bygg AB, registered in 
Sweden) posted workers from Latvia to work on the refurbishment of a school near Stockholm. 
Swedish unions protested because L&P agreed to pay its Latvian workers in Sweden the 
equivalent of €12 an hour.  Swedish unions demanded that L&P pay the equivalent of €16, the 
wage negotiated for Stockholm-area construction workers, and blocked access to the work site 
when L&P refused. L&P sued to stop the union‘s action, lost in Swedish labour courts in late 
2004, and subsequently left Stockholm (see the discussion in Woolfson and Sommers 2006; and 
Tamas and Munz, 2006). However, after L&P brought the case back to the Swedish labour court, 
                                                 
13
 Another important reason for the relatively low number of A8 migrants in Sweden, compared to the UK and 
Ireland, may have been the Swedish language. Recent research has shown that the desire to learn English has been a 
major motivation of many A8 migrants coming to the UK and Ireland since EU enlargement (see, for example, 
Anderson et al., 2006). 
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it was eventually sent to the European Court of Justice (EJC). In December 2007, the ECJ ruled – 
to the great shock of Swedish trades unions - that the unions‘ blockade and sympathy actions to 
combat social dumping against Laval un Partneri represented a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services. The ruling effectively restricted Swedish trade unions‘ right to take industrial 
action to force foreign companies into signing collective agreements when operating in Sweden. 
It is now the responsibility of the Swedish Labour Court to adjust the ECJ‘s ruling to national 
regulations. (European Industrial Relations Observatory website
14
)  
 
Very recently, the Swedish government began to consider increased labour immigration of ―vital 
importance to Sweden‘s ability to meet both present and future challenges in the labour market‖ 
(Swedish Ministry of Justice 2008, p.1). In December 2008, new rules for regulating labour 
immigration from outside the EEA were introduced. These rules make it easier for employers to 
recruit migrant workers of all skill levels from outside the EEA, mainly because of the removal of 
the previous requirement that any application for a work permit for a non-EEA national needs to 
be approved by the Swedish Public Employment Service. However, compared to most other high-
income countries, Sweden‘s new labour immigration policies still put significant emphasis on 
ensuring that immigration does not undermine the maintenance of employment rights and 
conditions. Under the new rules, job vacancies must have been advertised in Sweden and the EU 
and the terms of employment must be equivalent to those provided by a Swedish collective 
agreement or to customary terms and conditions for the occupation or industry. Furthermore, the 
relevant union must be given the opportunity to state an opinion on the terms of employment 
(Swedish Migration Board website
15
). All this is ―to ensure that there is sound competition for 
jobs in the labour market and to avoid social dumping‖ (Swedish Ministry of Justice 2008, p.2). 
The temporary work permits are valid for two years and renewable. After 48 months, the 
employee will be eligible for a permanent residence permit. 
Although it is too early to tell, Sweden‘s new rules for regulating labour immigration from 
outside the EEA may signal a new policy approach that is less influenced by trades unions and 
that involves admitting greater number of migrant workers than in the past. Unions and their 
                                                 
14
 See http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2008/01/articles/SE0801019I.htm accessed on 8 December 2008 
15
 See http://www.migrationsverket.se/english.jsp accessed on 8 December 2008 
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economic interests appear to have been a major factor in determining Sweden‘s past policy of 
relatively low numbers but comprehensive rights for migrant workers. ). It is possible that EU 
enlargement and the new rules for labour immigration from outside the EEA will shift the 
numbers-rights balance in Sweden toward greater numbers and fewer rights for migrant workers.    
 
Balancing numbers and rights: protecting welfare systems and reviving temporary migration 
programmes  
 
Most liberal-democratic high-income countries strike a balance between the number and rights of 
migrant workers that falls between the two extremes of the GCC states on the one hand (large 
numbers, few rights) and Sweden on the other (few numbers, comprehensive rights).  It is clear, 
however, that trade-offs are being made in various countries and that economic considerations are 
often the main motivation.  The trade-offs are often most explicit with regard to the social rights 
(especially access to the welfare system) of migrant workers. For example, in 1996 the United 
States decided to keep legal immigration high by restricting access to means tested welfare 
benefits and adopting a ―one-strike and you are out‖ policy toward immigrants who committed 
felony crimes. The Commission on Immigration Reform, reacting to the perceived cost of 
providing tax-supported services to immigrants that led to approval of Proposition 187 in 
November 1994 in California
16
, urged Congress to reduce immigrant admissions but maintain 
immigrant access to social safety net programmes (US Commission on Immigration Reform, 
1995). Congress rejected this recommendation, and instead kept immigrant numbers high and 
reduced migrant access to benefits.
17
 In his analysis of the politics of immigration control in the 
US, Tichenor (2002: 284) described this policy as 
 
“a triumph for free market expansionists, who allied with pro-immigration liberals to 
sustain unprecedented legal admissions with anti-immigrant conservatives to trim alien 
                                                 
16
 The purpose of Proposition 187 was to deny illegal aliens and their children welfare benefits, nonemergency 
healthcare, and public education. Proposition 187 was approved by voters in California but later declared 
unconstitutional by a federal court (see Tichenor, 2002). 
17
 Migration News (1996) ‗Welfare Overhaul and Minimum Wage Changes‘ Vol. 3, No. 4, September. Available at 
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1022_0_2_0 
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substantive and procedural rights. The outcomes of 1996 suggested that large-scale 
immigration would flow into the United States uninterrupted for the foreseeable future, 
and that those who arrived would enjoy fewer membership rights until they acquired 
citizenship”. 
 
A similar trade-off between openness to immigration and migrant‘s access to welfare rights could 
also be observed when the UK and Ireland opened their labour markets to workers from the new 
EU member states in May 2004. The right to freely take up employment in the ―flexible‖ labour 
markets in Ireland and the UK was accompanied by increased restrictions on migrants‘ access to 
unemployment and welfare benefits (see National Economic and Social Council of Ireland 2006; 
Ruhs 2007). This was because both countries were concerned, partly due to intense political 
pressure and a very heated public debate (especially in the UK), about ―welfare migrants‖, i.e. the 
potential danger of a large number of migrants coming to take up welfare benefits rather than 
work. More than one million East European migrants have moved and taken up employment in 
the UK and Ireland since May 2004, half of whom are thought to have since returned to their 
home countries (see  Pollard et al. 2008; MAC 2008).   
 
The (re-)introduction or expansion of temporary migration programmes (TMPs) for low-skilled 
workers in various high-income countries is another reflection of an increasingly common policy 
approach that involves a trade-off between the numbers and rights of low-skilled migrant 
workers. Temporary migration programmes increase the number of migrants working legally 
abroad but at the same time restrict the rights of migrant workers in various different ways. 
Although policy details vary across TMPs in different countries, and between TMPs for different 
groups of workers or sectors within countries, most programmes restrict migrants‘ access to social 
welfare benefits, free movement in the labour market and often also to family reunion (for 
reviews and comparative analysis of TMPS for low-skilled workers in different countries, see, for 
example, Martin 2007; Ruhs 2006, 2003; and GAO 2006). TMPs are controversial because of the 
unanticipated consequences such programmes generated in the past (see, for example, Castles 
2006). This included the non-return and eventual settlement of many guest workers, partly 
because some migrants illegally overstayed their temporary employment permits (as was the case 
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following the end of the Bracero programme in the USA in the early 1960s) or because migrants 
remained legally, and subsequently brought their families, because of rights acquired over time in 
the host country (the German experience in the 1970s). A number of economic measures and 
incentives have been proposed to minimize the risk of migrants overstaying their temporary 
employment visas (see, for example, Ruhs, 2006; Abella, 2006). Much of the recent discussion 
about new guest-worker programmes revolves around the feasibility and the normative 
implications of these measures and of the restrictions of migrant rights that are inherent to all such 
programmes. 
 
It is interesting to note that, in addition to countries that have some experience with guest worker 
programmes in the past, TMPs for low-skilled workers are also becoming increasingly popular in 
countries that used to admit mainly skilled migrants on a permanent basis such as Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. Canada, for example, recently expanded migration channels for 
temporary low-skilled migrants. The increase has been most pronounced in Alberta, were there 
were 22,000 temporary migrant workers in 2006, a 41 percent increase over the previous year. 
Most of this increase was accounted for by a significant rise in the work permits issues to low-
skilled migrant workers. Work permits tied workers to a specific employer. Most migrants 
employed under Canada‘s new TMPs for low-skilled workers have taken jobs in cleaning, 
hospitality, manufacturing, oil and gas and construction (Elgersma 2007). Temporary migration 
programmes are also expanding in New Zealand, where the government started a bilateral 
Seasonal Labour Scheme for Pacific Islanders in 2007 (see IOM 2008, chapter 3; World Bank 
2006).  
 
4 The effects of migrant rights on human development 
 
The discussion now turns to the key question motivating this paper: how do migrant rights affect 
human development?  The analysis distinguishes between: (i) the capability to move and take up 
employment abroad; and (ii) capabilities while living and working abroad. I argue that there can 
be a tension between these two capabilities and that this creates an important question for 
normative analysis and public debate. 
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4.1   The capability to move and work abroad 
 
Compared to international trade and capital flows, the scale of international migration remains 
relatively limited in the global economy.  In 2005, the ratios of exports and outward FDI to world 
GPD were 28 percent (IMF) and 24 percent (UNCTAD), respectively. In contrast, migrants 
constituted only about three percent of the world population in 2005 (ten percent in more 
developed regions, see UNPD 2006). The main reason for this asymmetry lies with immigration 
policies of middle and high-income countries which generally welcome skilled and highly skilled 
workers but are very restrictive with regard to admitting low-skilled workers. In other words, 
while skilled workers in low-income and low-capability countries find it relatively easy to 
migrate abroad, the capability of low-skilled workers to gain access to labour markets in higher 
income countries is very limited. Although it is clear that emigration cannot be a ―magic bullet‖, 
expanding the capability of low-skilled workers in low-income countries to move and legally take 
up employment in higher-income countries may be a powerful way of promoting human 
development of migrants and their families. Under certain circumstances, it may also contribute 
to wider development in migrants‘ countries of origin.  
 
Compared to residents of the host country, migrants typically face a disadvantage in the labour 
market on arrival (see, for example, Clark and Drinkwater 2008). For many but not all migrant 
groups, this disadvantage tends to become smaller over time, partly because migrants acquire 
more skills (including language skills), work experience, and social networks that are specific to 
the host country (see, for example, Venturini and Villosio 2008). In some countries, such as in 
many GCC countries, the wages of migrants never catch up with those of citizens as labour 
markets are completely segmented.   
 
However, even if the wages that migrants earn abroad are lower than those of residents with 
comparable skills and experience, they are typically significantly higher than the wages migrants 
would receive in their countries of origin. Freeman (2006) suggests that wages of workers in 
high-income countries typically exceed those of workers in similar jobs in low-income countries 
by four to 12 times. In 2004, the average gross national income per capita of the ten new member 
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states that joined the EU in 2004 was about a fifth of that in the EU15, and about 40 per cent 
when measured in purchasing power parities (Brucker, 2007). These international wage 
differences mean that migrants can significantly raise their productivity and make very large 
financial gains from employment abroad. 
 
Because international wage differentials far exceed differences in commodity prices and interest 
rates, the global efficiency gains of increased migration—most of which would accrue to 
migrants—are significantly greater than those of further liberalizing international trade and 
capital flows (see Rodrik, 2002; Freeman, 2006). The World Bank (2005) estimates that 
increasing the share of migrants in high-income countries by 3 per cent (about 13.2m people) 
would generate a global real-income gain of over $350 billion, exceeding the estimated gains 
from global trade reform by about 13 per cent. If migrants transfer some of their benefits back to 
their home countries—in the form of remittances, investment, and/or knowledge transfers—
migrant-sending countries may reap a significant share of these global income gains from 
migration. 
 
According to the World Bank (2008), remittance flows to developing countries amounted to about 
US$265 billion in 2007 (more than double the figure in 2002). Global remittance flows are more 
than twice as large as total development aid and represent the largest source of foreign exchange 
for numerous countries. The World Bank also predicts that, during the economic downturn, 
remittances are unlikely to fall as much as private flows and official aid to developing countries 
(World Bank 2008, Migration and Development Brief 8). As shown in Figure 1 in the Appendix, 
among low-income countries, the top three remittance receiving countries in 2008 were India 
(US$ 30 billion), China ($27bn) and Mexico ($24bn). Measured against GDP, remittances were 
highest in Tajikistan (45 percent), Moldova (38 percent) and Tonga (35 percent).  Figure 1 below 
shows the origins of remittance flows to developing countries in 2008. The US, Western Europe 
and the GCC countries are the main sources of remittances but the relative share of each varies 
across destinations (of remittances). In Bangladesh and Pakistan, remittances from the GCC states 
accounted for 63 percent and 52 percent, respectively, of all remittances inflows in 2008 (World 
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Bank 2008). More than 80 percent of migrant workers from Bangladesh, and over 70 percent of 
migrants from India, are working in GCC countries (DESA 2006, p.5).  
 
Figure 1: Sources of remittances by recipient regions, 2008 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2008, Migration and Development Brief 2008, p.9 
 
It is important to emphasise that more low-skilled migration does not automatically translate into 
faster development of migrants‘ countries of origin. The effects of remittances, and emigration 
more generally, can be mixed both in theory and practice (see, for example, Lucas 2005). 
Research and the experiences of countries of large-scale emigration—such as Egypt, Mexico, and 
the Philippines—suggest that sending workers abroad cannot, on its own, be an effective 
development strategy (ILO, 2004). Nevertheless, it is clear that, if used effectively, remittances 
and other transfers migrants make back to their home countries can be of significant benefit to 
migrants‘ families and/or to the overall economies of migrants‘ countries of origin. 
 
The discussion in the previous section has shown that, in practice, we can observe a negative 
relationship between the numbers and some of the socio-economic and other rights of migrant 
workers in high-income countries. To maximize the economic benefits of low-skilled 
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immigration, high-income countries can have economic incentives to carefully and selectively 
restrict some of the socio-economic rights of migrants. These rights include the rights to free 
choice of employment, the right to selected welfare benefits and the right to stay permanently in 
the host country. The implication is that the goal of increasing workers capabilities to move and 
take up low-skilled jobs in high-income countries may require a (at least temporary) restriction of 
some of these rights of migrants. Insisting on full and immediate equality of economic and social 
rights with citizens – as it would be the case if low-skilled migrants are given permanent 
residence status right upon admission – may be an obstacle to achieving the goal of increasing the 
number of workers in low-income countries who can access and benefit from working in low-
skilled jobs in high-income countries. The comparison between the high numbers-low rights 
policies of Kuwait with the low numbers-comprehensive rights policies of Sweden is instructive 
here.        
 
4.2 Capabilities while living and working abroad 
 
Migrant rights obviously have an important impact on  migrants‘ human development while 
living and working abroad. As human development is defined as enlarging choice, capabilities 
and freedoms, we can generally expect that the economic, social, political,  and cultural rights that 
migrants effectively enjoy
18
 will have a positive impact on their human development. For 
example, the right to public health care and education will promote good health and development 
of knowledge. Cultural rights enable migrants to practice their own cultures and traditions. The 
right to family reunion enables a family life. Access to the welfare state could, among other 
things, offer support in times of economic hardship. And employment rights, such as the rights to 
a minimum wage (where it exists) and the right to join trade unions will in many cases enable 
migrants to achieve better outcomes in the labour market.
19
  Conversely, the lack of rights, 
                                                 
18
 I am now discussing rights that migrants can actually exercise in practice rather than rights in formal law that exist 
―on paper‖ but are not implemented in practice.    
19
 There is of course considerable debate about the impact of labour market rights and institutions, including the 
rights to minimum wage and collective bargaining rights, on the labour market outcomes of workers. Some 
economists argue that more rights and institutions make the labour market less flexible and thus, for example, 
increase the likelihood of unemployment. I acknowledge but do not go into the detail of these debates in this paper. 
For a review of the impact of the minimum wage on employment, see, for example, Neumark and Wascher, 2007; for 
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especially the most basic human rights, can lead to situations where migrants‘ welfare and 
capability to act becomes highly dependent on their employer which can lead to very ―unfree‖ 
living and working conditions.   
 
Various national and international institutions concerned with migrants have published a large 
number of reports and case studies documenting how a lack of rights can have highly adverse 
impacts on migrants‘ personal safety, physical and mental health, ability to participate in social 
life and outcomes in the labour market. The academic literature on how rights impact on human 
development is much more limited. Most analyses do not consider specific rights but instead 
distinguish between the four major types of immigration status each of which is generally 
associated with different rights and restrictions: ―illegally resident‖; ―temporary (legal) resident‖; 
―permanent (legal) resident‖ and ―citizen‖. There are some analyses in the economic literature on 
how different types of immigration status – or the transition from one status to another- impact on 
migrants‘ outcomes in the labour market (see Ruhs 2009). Most of this work concerns the effects 
of illegality. 
 
Their ―deportability‖ can put illegally resident migrants in a vulnerable position in the host 
country (De Genova 2002).  Some employers may offer illegally resident migrants lower wages 
and inferior employment conditions, either because they take advantage of migrant‘s deportability 
and/or simply to account for the increased risk associated with employing migrants without legal 
residence rights. Taylor (1992) suggests that cost-minimising employers will allocate illegally 
residents migrants to jobs where the expected cost of apprehension is lowest; and that such jobs 
are likely to be relatively low skilled jobs. This type of employer discrimination is most likely to 
occur when employers know about the (illegal) immigration status of their migrant employees. It 
may, however, also arise from employers‘ perceptions – rather than direct knowledge – of their 
workers‘ immigration status. Qualitative research in the UK has shown that, in practice, 
employers frequently do not know or ―choose not to know‖ their workers immigration status 
(Ruhs and Anderson 2008).    
 
                                                                                                                                                              
a for a critical discussion of the impact of labour market institutions on labour market flexibility see, for example, 
Howell et al 2007.     
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Deportability may also impact on migrants‘ earnings through mechanisms that are not directly 
related to employer discrimination. Importantly, illegal residence status may alter migrants‘ 
behavior in the labour market (Kossoudju and Cobb-Clark 2002). Migrants without the right to 
reside may, for example, have lower reservation wages than workers with the right to legal 
residence. The fear of being deported could also discourage migrants from investing in the 
development of host-country specific human capital (Chiswick 1984). Illegal residence status 
could also impact on the kinds of social networks that migrants may access, which, in turn may 
affect migrants‘ access to well-paying jobs (Massey 1987). A more general point is that illegal 
status usually constrains migrants‘ choice of employment in the host country and thereby prevents 
migrants from maximizing the returns to their human capital (Calavita 1992).  
 
Although not at constant risk of removal, migrants employed on legal temporary work permits in 
low-skilled occupations may also experience lower earnings because of their immigration status. 
Temporary work permits for low-skilled workers typically restrict migrants‘ employment to the 
sector and employer specified on the work permit. Where a change of employer is allowed, a new 
application for a work permit is usually required by the new employer. This requirement naturally 
restricts migrants‘ choice of employment in the labour market and may make it difficult to leave 
jobs offering adverse employment conditions. Furthermore, a temporary migrant‘s right to legal 
residence is usually tied to ongoing employment in the host country. As it can be the case with 
illegally resident migrants, unscrupulous employers may take advantage of temporary migrants‘ 
employment restrictions and offer employment conditions that are lower than those enjoyed by 
migrants with permanent residence status.  
 
Most of the very limited empirical research on the impacts of immigration status on migrants‘ 
labour market outcomes has focused on the effects of illegality. Most studies have been carried 
out in the US, especially in the aftermath of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA). IRCA gave amnesty (including eventual permanent residence status) to undocumented 
immigrants – about 1.7 million outside agriculture20 – who could prove continuous residence in 
                                                 
20
 A separate legalization programme for agriculture – the Special Agricultural Workers program – legalized an 
additional 1.3 million people who could prove 90 days of employment in the perishable crop sector in the year before 
IRCA, or more than 30 days in each of the previous three years (Papademetriou et al 2004).  
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the US since 1982. Rivera-Batiz (1999) found that illegal status adversely affects migrants‘ 
earnings even after controlling for migrants individual characteristics. This finding contradicted 
the results from earlier (pre-IRCA) studies which often concluded that the wage differential 
between legal and illegal immigrants could be mostly accounted for by differences between the 
characteristics and human capital of the two groups (see, for example, Bailey 1985; Massey 
1987). Comparing legalized migrants‘ earnings before and after legalization, Rivera Batiz (1999) 
further concluded that legalization led to significant wage growth for legalized migrants. 
Kossoudi and Cobb-Clark (2002) also find that IRCA had positive earnings effects for legalized 
migrants. Kossoudi and Clark suggest that much of the wage growth following legalization can be 
attributed to increased returns to human capital (also see Tienda and Singer 1995).  
 
There are a few systematic analyses that investigate the role of legal status as a determinant of 
migrants‘ wages in Europe. Baldacci et al (1999) find that illegal status imposes a significant 
wage penalty on migrants in Italy. In a more recent study, Ruhs (2009) analyses the impact of EU 
enlargement on the earnings of East European workers who were already working in the UK 
before 1
st
 May 2004 – legally or illegally. The preliminary results suggest a significant positive 
impact of acquiring EU status on earnings - in the order of 6-8 percent – but no significant impact 
of legalization on its own.     
 
Most of the existing economic literature thus confirms the expectation that immigration status 
(and associated rights) can be a significant determinant of migrants‘ labour market outcomes and 
that illegality and/or temporary residence status can have a significant adverse impact on earnings 
when compared to permanent resident status and/or citizenship.
21
 Expanding employment rights 
can thus be generally expected to have beneficial effects on the economic welfare and human 
development of migrants. Greater capabilities of migrant workers will often also raise the human 
development of family members who are living with the migrant abroad.  
 
                                                 
21
 It is important to emphasise, however, that the effects of immigration status are likely to be highly specific to 
country and time. For example, in labour markets where the enforcement of immigration and employment laws is 
relatively low, there can be many factors, unrelated to migrancy and immigration status, that make workers 
vulnerable in the workplace.   
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It is tempting to further conclude that, because of the beneficial impacts on migrant‘s human 
development, expanding rights will also promote the human development of those ―left-behind‖ 
(family members and/or others) in migrants‘ countries of origin. For example, if expanding rights 
leads to higher wages, remittances may also increase. The suggestion that more rights for 
migrants will also promote development in migrants‘ countries of origin is a plausible possibility. 
However, it is also important to consider potential exceptions and trade-offs where an increase in 
certain rights for migrants may lead to a reduction in the benefits of migration for migrants‘ 
countries of origin. For example, migrants on temporary residence permits – especially those with 
families in their home countries – can be expected to remit more of their wages than migrants 
with permanent residence status abroad. Although the overall empirical evidence on this issue is 
mixed, there is some evidence that remittances initially increase but eventually decrease with a 
migrant‘s duration of stay in the host country, reflecting the counteracting forces of wage 
increases (which increase remittances) on the one hand and increased detachment from the home 
country and family reunification (lowering remittances) over time (see, for example, the review in 
Carling 2008). Acquiring the right to permanent residence will benefit migrants‘ human 
development but the associated decline in remittances (and, if migrants are highly skilled, the 
potential permanent loss of human capital) could lower human development in migrants‘ 
countries of origin. Of course, the impact of rights on remittances is just one type of effect that 
may be outweighed by other beneficial impacts for sending countries. The research on this issue 
is, however, limited.   
4.3 How to balance numbers and rights to promote human development?  
 
The analysis has shown that there can be a tension between the positive effects of migrant rights 
on human development on migrants while living and working abroad, and the negative effects 
that some socio-economic rights may have on the capability of workers in low-income countries 
to access labour markets of higher-income countries. This tension raises an important and difficult 
question about how to best balance the two sets of capabilities. This is an inherently normative 
question that different people will think about and evaluate in different ways. A consequentialist 
ethical framework may more readily accept restrictions of individual rights to achieve certain 
outcomes than a strong rights-based position (for a discussion of ethics in immigration policy, 
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see, for example, Ruhs and Chang 2004; Gibney 2004). Although most people would agree that it 
is important insist on at least basic human rights for all people regardless of outcomes, there is no 
single answer to the question whether and under what circumstance it is justifiable to restrict 
specific socio-economic rights of individuals. For example, Wickramasekara (2008) argues that 
―the idea that source countries can expand overseas employment of their nationals by agreeing to 
reductions in their rights is morally unacceptable, and indeed violates international norms. All 
migrant workers have basic rights as human beings and workers which cannot be traded-off‖ 
(p.1258). Carens (2008) argues that, even if there is a trade off between migrant numbers and 
rights, restrictions of migrant rights are always morally problematic ―because they violate  the 
state‘s own understanding of morally acceptable conditions of employment‖ (p.421). In contrast, 
Bell and Piper (2005) suggest that unequal rights under a guest worker program could be morally 
justified if three conditions are met: (a) if they benefit migrant workers, as decided by migrant 
workers themselves; (b) if they create opportunities for people to improve their lives; and (c) if 
there are no feasible alternatives to (a) and (b). (Bell and Piper, 2005: 214).  
 
As discussed in section 2, the human development approach urges ―public debate and reasoning‖ 
about conflicting dimensions of development. As a ―people-centred‖ approach, it also emphasizes 
the agency and choice of individuals. The debate about how to balance the capability to move and 
work abroad with capabilities while living and working abroad thus needs to consider the 
perspectives of migrants and their countries of origin.  
 
Large numbers of migrant workers are employed in countries that severely restrict migrants‘ 
rights, suggesting that many workers are willing to tolerate, at least temporarily, a trade-off 
between higher wages and fewer rights (also see Abella 2008). Of course, the mere presence of 
migrants in countries with ―high numbers – low rights‖ policies does not mean that such policies 
are in the migrants‘ best interests and therefore desirable. Nevertheless, the fact that migrants 
often pay significant recruitment fees to work in such countries highlights the need for a more 
explicit discussion of the choices that many workers in developing countries face. We can expect 
considerable variation in migrants‘ motivations. Migrants‘ intentions (e.g. temporary or 
permanent stay abroad) and their ―frame of reference‖ are likely to be important determinants of 
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the choices they make at particular points in time. The role of good information in order to make 
informed and rational decisions is likely to be key. Narrow rights-based approaches to migration 
rarely discuss the agency of migrant workers, i.e. their capacity to make rational and independent 
decisions when faced with limited options. Instead they often tend to treat migrants as victims of 
recruiters and smugglers rather than rational economic agents maximizing within constraints.    
       
Sending countries do not always insist on equality of rights in order not to reduce the access of its 
nationals to labour markets abroad. For example, some major migrant-sending countries are 
reluctant to ratify the International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families for fear of losing jobs for their nationals abroad (Piper and Iredale 
2003). The conflict between migrant rights and better access to jobs in high-income countries is 
also apparent in the negotiations about the role of wage-parity in the international movement of 
service providers within ‗Mode 4‘ (which regulates the ‗movement of natural persons‘) of the 
World Trade Organization‘s General Agreement on Trade in Services. Many high- income 
countries want wage parity to protect the jobs of their nationals, but some major sending countries 
assert that equal wages would limit the numbers of their migrants abroad. ‗Wage parity . . . is 
intended to provide a non-discriminatory environment, [but] tends to erode the cost advantage of 
hiring foreigners and works like a de facto quota‘ (Chaudhuri et al. 2004, p. 366). Chanda (2001, 
p. 635) goes further, asserting that wage parity ‗negates the very basis of cross-country labour 
flows which stems from endowment-based cost differentials between countries‘.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The rights of migrant workers play an important yet under-researched role in shaping the effects 
of migration on the human development of migrants, their families and of those ―left-behind‖ in 
migrants‘ countries of origin. A comprehensive analysis of the relationship between migrant 
rights and human development must consider the intrinsic value of rights and engage with the 
human rights framework that has been central to most discussion of migrant rights to date. It must 
also, however, recognise that migrant rights are a subset of ―citizenship rights‖ that derive from 
nation states and that, in practice, are often severely restricted. In practice, migrant rights can be 
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an important part of nation states‘ immigration policies. The analysis of the effects of migrant 
rights thus needs to consider potential inter-relationships with other aspects of immigration 
policy, especially the number and selection of migrants admitted to high-income countries, and 
consider the overall effects of particular ―immigration policy regimes‖ on human development.    
 
Viewed in this way, it cannot simply be assumed that ―more rights‖ will automatically translate 
into increased human development of migrants, their families and people left-behind in migrants‘ 
countries of origin. To be sure, the protection of rights will in many cases be very important to 
promoting the human development of workers living and working abroad. The expansion of the 
rights of migrants can be expected to enhance migrants‘ capabilities while abroad. However, as 
discussed in this paper, migrant rights can also have an impact on low-skilled workers‘ capability 
to legally move and work abroad. The economic interests and policies of high income countries 
can help generate a negative relationship (a trade off) between the number of low-skilled migrants 
admitted and some of their socio-economic rights after admission. This trade off arises from the 
fiscal and labour market effects of low-skilled immigration, the large supply of workers in low-
income countries seeking access to low-skilled jobs in high-income countries, and from the 
downward sloping demand curve for labour with regard to employment rights that create costs for 
employers. The paper has presented empirical examples that support the hypothesis of a trade-off 
driven by economic mechanisms and effects. There is, however, clearly a need for more 
systematic empirical research that includes a larger number of countries and that investigates 
alternative explanations of the relationship between the number and rights of low-skilled migrant 
workers.          
 
The trade-off between increased access to high income countries and socio-economic rights after 
admission is at the core of current discussions about new or expanded temporary migration 
programmes for low-skilled migrant workers. Such programmes can increase the number of low-
skilled workers legally employed abroad while restricting some of migrants‘ rights abroad. The 
restrictions of rights of TMPs vary significantly between different countries and for different 
groups of migrants within a particular country. Most people would agree that the restrictions of 
rights that we currently observe in the GCC states would be unacceptable in liberal democracies. 
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However, there is no easy or universal answer as to when and under what circumstances it is 
desirable to accept the selective restriction of some socio-economic rights (such as the right to 
free choice of employment, access to social benefits, and the right to permanent stay in the host 
country) in order to facilitate better access of low-skilled workers to the labour markets of higher-
income countries. Some view temporary migration programmes that restrict migrant rights as 
inherently discriminatory , unfeasible and thus undesirable, others (including this author) suggest 
that they may promote human development by expanding workers‘ choice and capabilities to 
legally move and work abroad, and that it is therefore important to ask how new TMPs could 
avoid the  adverse consequences of past programmes. If we take a people-centred approach that 
emphasises agency and choice, the debate about TMPs must take account of the perspectives of 
migrants and, perhaps to a lesser extent, also their countries of origin. To progress the debate, it 
would also be useful to begin a discussion about the ―core‖ rights that we agree must never be 
restricted under any TMP, regardless of the effects for development and other consequences.  
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